Humanitarian intervention is the one of the most critical concepts with respect to legality and legitimacy. Although, there is no common definitions, theorists or international community defines it as violations of human rights. The main aim of this study is to argue that the international community has the responsibility to intervene to prevent a humanitarian crisis. This research also attempts to clarify the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions which are limited to cases of threats to international peace, security and where there exists prior authorization by the UNSC. The article argues that humanitarian interventions should only be established under the authorization of the UNSC; and that when violation of human rights is interpreted as a threat to international peace and security, if an intervention has been authorized by the SC, it is legal.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the modern geopolitical era, the concept of 'humanitarian intervention' has always been problematic. Although there is no commonly accepted definition about its exact meaning, it can be defined for the purposes of this study in terms of protecting people from the threat of attack; and addressing a humanitarian crisis in a foreign state. Indeed, it always constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The most important pre-condition justifying such intervention is that of humanitarian crisis; and/or human rights violations occurring at such a level as to pose to a threat international peace and security. If such a crisis has the potential to expand to other countries or the entire region, the international community, in particular the Security Council (SC) under the United Nations Charter has the legal right to protect fundamental human rights within a sovereign state: because of the threat posed to peace and security. Above all, if the human rights violations constitute crimes against humanity (Resolution, 1970; Magnan, 2000) the international community has the right to intervene: but this must be based upon the SC resolutions and authorization. The purpose of this article is to argue that the international community has the responsibility to intervene to prevent a humanitarian crisis. This article also attempts to clarify the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. Such interventions are limited to cases of threats to international peace, security and where there exists prior authorization by the UNSC, based on the UN Charter. This article also analyses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention into Kosovo within the framework of the Charter. It is argued that the humanitarian intervention of NATO into Kosovo clearly violates the UN Charter. Moreover, this article also analyses the intervention in Libya within the framework of the consideration of human rights violations, and what the UN Charter legally allows. Humanitarian intervention in general: Humanitarian intervention has been allotted many different definitions: indeed, there is no common description in either international agreements, or the UN Charter. Consequently, all authors or organizations use their own definitions in order to justify humanitarian intervention. These generally include: military intervention (Roberts, 1993) protecting human rights in a state (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996) widespread suffering or protecting human life in a foreign territory (Finnemore, 1996) . NATO's definition, adopted in Scheveningen on November 1999, stated that: "A humanitarian intervention is an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address (the threat of) a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights." According to this definition, the main aim of humanitarian intervention is to protect and address humanitarian problems; yet no specific definition of the level of fundamental human rights violations which would justify intervention is provided. Humanitarian intervention is also defined as: "The threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights" (Murphy, 1996) . This definition places a firm emphasis on the maintenance of fundamental human rights. If these come under threat within a sovereign state, the UNSC adopts resolutions and implements necessary steps, in order to address this. If the problem still continues, international organizations may use force, as long as it is authorized by the SC. It is clear, therefore, that the SC has all roles which are paramount in the Magnan (2000) there are some tools to establish intervention in a state without SC authorization: "It must be a case of gross human rights violations amounting to crimes against humanity (murder, torture, rape, etc.) (Article 7 of the Rome Statute), all available peaceful settlement procedures must have been exhausted, and the government of the state where the atrocities take place must be unable or unwilling to rectify the situation" (Magnan, 2000) . Moreover, if human rights violations are of such an extent that they either involve or seem likely to result in genocide (Article 6 of The Rome Statute), the international community does have the right to intervene, in order to protect fundamental human rights. Therefore, in cases of humanitarian crisis, which seem likely to or are already affecting international peace and security, the international community can use force to stop this, as long as it has been authorized by the SC. View of international community and the SC resolutions to case of Kosovo: Until late 1997, the international community was not able to cope with the brutal and rapidly escalating war in Kosovo. After the first major violent clashes, it finally allotted it a high position on the political agenda (Calic, 2000) After late 1997, the International Contact Group (ICG) became very concerned about the case of Kosovo, and the international community opened dialogue with Pristine (Calic, 2000) ; but Belgrade rejected all proposals, because of their continued stance that Kosovo was an internal Serbian affair. Given the increasing violence in the region, and continued intransigence of the Serbian authorities, the ICG stated: "Their view that the FRY needs to address this question urgently, and that making progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo is critical for Belgrade to improve its international position and relations with the international community. The Contact Group expressed its readiness to facilitate the dialogue." (Contact Group Meeting) Until 1998, the SC did not take any responsibility of stopping human rights violations in Kosovo. But following continued outbreaks of violence, and mass civilian deaths, UNSCR 1160 were finally agreed (Revolution, 1160) . This was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter: imposing a comprehensive arms embargo on the FRY and Kosovo, as well as economic and diplomatic sanctions against the FRY (Simma, 1999 (Craig, 1999; Weller, 1999; Buckley, 2000; Waller and Drezov, 2001; Pavlowitch, 2002) . The NATO intervention in Kosovo: On March 24, 1999, despite having no SC authorization to do so, NATO began an air campaign over the FRY. These air strikes were code named, Operation Allied Force (OAF) (Meulenbeek, 2013) . After the intervention, many doubts were expressed as to its legitimacy; and the international community encountered a dilemma between international legality and moral duty, with respect to both ending serious human rights violations, and the unlawful use of force. NATO's intervention was, as has been shown, the result of a humanitarian crisis in the FRY. On 12 April, NATO stated: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has repeatedly violated United Nations Security Council resolutions. The unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, on Kosovar civilians has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe which also threatens to destabilize the surrounding region…We condemn these appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of force by the Yugoslav government. These extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have made necessary and justify the military action by NATO" (The Situation in and around Kosovo). NATO also set a number of targets for the intervention: "1) stop to all military action and ending immediately violence; 2) withdrawal from Kosovo all security forces; 3) international military force will be deployed by the international community; 4) safe return of all refugees and displaced persons; 5) the establishment of an agreement in the basis of Rambouillet Accords in accordance with international law and the UN Charter" (NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo). The air campaign continued until Slobodan Milosevic capitulated to the NATO demands. After its conclusion, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1244 (Resolution, 1244) . NATO believed that the international community would largely support its decision to intervene; and that a successful operation could legitimize a new role for it as a world policeman. Moreover, according to Cassese (1999) , the FRY authorities clearly did not flinch from massacring its people and other gross breaches of human rights: a state of affairs which would destabilize its neighbours and undermine peace and stability in the region (Cassese, 1999) . According to its members, NATO therefore used force against the FRY in order to stop violence. As a result of UNSCR 1244, international security forces were deployed in Kosovo. Their responsibilities included: a) deterring renewed hostilities; b) maintaining and enforcing a ceasefire; c) ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return of FRY paramilitary and police forces from Kosovo; d) demilitarizing the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian armed groups; e) establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety; f) ensuring public safety and order; g) supervising demining; h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself; i) Conducting border monitoring duties (Resolution, 1244). The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the SC to undertake these duties (Neuhouser et al., 2008) . When the Resolution 144 was published, NATO halted its air campaign and attacks over the FRY: clearly, the UN had deliberately delayed its own decision, casting further doubt over the operation's international legality and morality. The legality of intervention: Some scholars believe that the NATO intervention violated international law, and can be termed as an "aggression" against the FRY; whereas others consider it to have constituted a humanitarian intervention and, indeed, a legal one. One of the established goals of NATO is self-defence. According to Article 5 of its Treaty, if an armed attack occurs against any member, NATO can adopt individual or collective self-defence, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter, by the SC takes measures to restore international peace and security.
(The North Atlantic Treaty) But neither the UN Charter nor SC allows for a military response in the absence of an armed attack against a member of a regional organization such as NATO; nor is one allowed in the absence of express SC authorization (Simma, 1999) . Moreover, as there was clearly no armed attack against the FRY or Kosovo from outside, the doctrine of self-defence cannot be employed. The SC does not possess any security forces. Therefore, when the SC adopts such a resolution, it gives the authority to a regional organization for use of force under its authorization. Many SC resolutions were passed in this case, but they neither authorized the use of force nor gave any authority to regional organizations or states (Resolution, 1244) . Also, Chapter VIII of the Charter, which lays out regional arrangements, does not include any authority to use any kind of force without SC authorization. Any intervention has to be based on SC authorisation; and NATO's execution of the humanitarian intervention did not include these provisions. NATO used a force in Kosovo without SC authorization because Russia and China, permanent members of the SC, had vetoed any resolution which authorized military force against a sovereign state because of what both regarded as an internal matter (Roberts, 1999; Greenwood, 2002; Teson, 2009; Khalid, 2011) . Both nations were strongly opposed to NATO intervention in Kosovo because they believed that it would only further expand US hegemony within the international community. On the basis of the traditional approaches to the interpretation of customary rules, treaties and secondary rules, and in accordance with the Legal Positivist approach, the intervention was unlawful: in other words, illegal (Gray, 2003; Teson, 2009) . The historical background of the problem and SC resolutions of the case of Libya: The starting point of the Libya protests surely owed to the rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt, which succeeded in toppling the leaders of both during the protests, many people were injured in a clash with security forces, and 3 people were killed on 16 February, in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi. (Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi; Time is running out for cornered Gaddafi) Human rights violations, then, began on that day. The activists also tried to organize large scale protests through social networking websites (Black, 2011; Cha, 2012) . resulting in many cities holding co-ordinated protests. Mass human rights violations also began to increase: according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), more than 84 people were killed by government security forces in three days (Libya: Security Forces Kills 84 over Three Days). By this stage, demonstrators had almost taken control of Libya's second largest city, Benghazi. In response, government security forces began to use snipers, helicopter gunships and other heavy military weapons. The government seemed intent on massacring its own people; the international community, indeed, began referring to these killings as a 'massacre' (Meo, 2011) . Given the SC has the primary responsibility to protect civilian populations from human rights violations, it was therefore now for it to seek to guarantee international peace and security.
(Libya Strategy of Scorched Earth, Desire for Widespread and Systematic Elimination) Accordingly, the SC adopted Resolution (1970) on 26 February 2011. This resolution was based on measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, and more specifically, Article 41. First, government security forces were required to immediately end violence in the state; after that, the Libyan government was required to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow access for international human rights monitors. The Prosecutor of the ICC would decide to refer the situation in Libya under this resolution. A military embargo was adopted by the SC; and a travel ban placed upon senior government managers. Moreover, the SC also froze the assets of Gaddafi and some government managers (Higgins, 1970 In accordance with its conclusions at the Istanbul meeting, NATO has a crucial role to protect civilians in Libya, and Operation Unified Protector will continue its operations until the SC Resolution is clearly implemented. Those involved in the meeting also stated that they respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Libya; and resolved to take new measures to provide continuous humanitarian assistance for all cities there. The final point of the ICG meeting concluded that the UN should help the Libyan people to implement post-conflict measures. (Conclusions of the Libya Contact Group Meeting). The Contact Group meets in Paris on 1 September (September 2011 Libya), and this meeting issue was about the unfreezing billions of Libya, also at the same time, the protesters captured the capital city Tripoli. It seems to clear that the international community will continue these meetings in the future to determine future status of the Libya. The legality of the intervention in Libya: Legal Positivists accept only two legal exceptions about humanitarian intervention. According to these exceptions, NATO intervention in Libya will now be analysed, with respect to Legal Positivism. There was no use of force or attack from outside of Libya; and therefore, the self-defence rule does not apply in this case. But there is a threat to international peace and security, and authorization from the UNSC. This is the main justification for this case being legal. Resolution (1973) , passed on 19 March by the SC, has some differences from other resolutions with respect to its breadth: for example, the UN has defined authorized the use of all necessary measures, including a no-fly zone, to protect people from the threat of attack by Gaddafi forces (Crook, 2011) . Moreover, permanent members of the SC and other members did not reject the resolution: which also has legal aspects, purely in terms of the vote itself. This time, the resolution had only 5 abstentions cast, including Russia: but abstentions do not prevent a resolution being passed. If one of the permanent members of the SC vetoes the resolution, it does not pass, and the SC does not take any decision. Therefore, the resolution is legal with respect to the consensus of the SC. To sum up, there have been many human rights violations in Libya, and the SC took a resolution to protect civilians from the threat of attacks: which passed with no veto. As mentioned above, that all necessary measures are to be taken under this resolution. The general aim is to protect civilians and maintain international peace and security. From a legal perspective, the intervention is based on entirely legal aspects with respect to the interpretation of the customary international law, treaties, and secondary rules, as well as legal positivists: the intervention in Libya is, indeed, legal. The comparison of Kosovo and Libya: Over the past two decades, the international arena has witnessed many different approaches with respect to international law: and especially, humanitarian intervention. Kosovo was the scene of an illegal intervention by NATO; Libya, a legal one by the same organization.
In terms of the SC Resolutions: there were three main resolutions about Kosovo, before the NATO intervention. Revolution (1160), passed in 1998, emphasized only an arms embargo, as well as economic and diplomatic sanctions against the FRY. Also, the resolution called upon the FRY to take all necessary steps to achieve a political solution, and open a meaningful dialogue with Kosovar Albanians (Revolution, 1160) . In this, the SC took some important measures to protect civilians from the threat of attacks, and maintain international peace and security through peaceful means. The second resolution was passed on 23 September 1998 by the SC. Resolution (1199) affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, FRY, constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter; demanded an immediate cease to hostilities and maintenance of a ceasefire in Kosovo. In particular, the authorities of both sides had to take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the region; and open a meaningful dialogue (Simma, 1999) . The SC specifically demanded some measures or steps to implement within the Contact Group statement (Resolution, 1199) and if these measures were not adopted by the FRY, the SC would implement additional measures to maintain peace and stability in the region. Military measures -including, above all, the use of all necessary measures -were not clear in this resolution, but NATO interpreted it as legitimizing the use of force against the FRY. It seems to clear that the SC did not provide any clear statement regarding the use of force against those violating human rights at this point. These resolutions would be completed by SCR 1203, which was passed before the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Resolution, 1203) . According to this, the SC restated its prior decisions about the FRY and Kosovo, particularly specified the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and re-emphasized the need to prevent it because of the threat to continuing peace and security in the region. The SC encouraged both sides to accept and support some agreement signed between the FRY-OSCE, and FRY-NATO. These resolutions included no clear statements about any kind of use of force against the FRY. The SC merely employed harsh language against the FRY. After the air campaign, the Security Council adopted (Resolution, 1244) . This agreed to the deployment of international security forces in Kosovo, with the responsibility to protect civilians and maintain peace and security in the region (Resolution, 1244). The UNMIK was established by the SC to undertake these duties (Neuhouser et al., 2008) . In effect, the SC neither took responsibility for nor avoided taking responsibility for the protection of civilians in the region. Following this intervention, international law had been clouded: both in terms of the legalization of the intervention, or the use of force. When we look at the case of Libya, two main resolutions apply. The SC adopted Resolution (1970) on 26 February 2011. Through this, the UNSC took some measures under the Chapter VII of the Charter, and Article 41. First, government security forces were required to immediately end violence in the state; and after that, the Libyan government had to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow access for international human rights monitors. The Prosecutor of the ICC would refer the situation in Libya under this resolution. A military embargo was agreed by the SC; and a travel ban imposed on senior government managers. Moreover, the SC froze the assets of Gaddafi, some government managers and Libyan Banks (Resolution, 1970) . The SC began to take clear responsibility for the Libyan case, and this time, was clearly not prepared for the diplomatic or legalistic waters to be at all muddied. The SC then passed, which authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians from threat and attack in Libya, while excluding a foreign occupation force (Resolution, 1973) . A no-fly zone over Libya was approved, and an immediate cease-fire demanded, as well as the complete end of violence against the civilian people ( Resolution, 1973) . This time, the SC had taken explicit responsibility for an on-going humanitarian crisis; and within just 1 month, had decided to use all necessary measures against the mercenaries. When the compare these two cases, it seems clear that the SC has expanded its own capabilities during the period between Kosovo and Libya. The SC's decision making processes over Kosovo was slow; over Libya, they were anything but. The first resolution about Kosovo passed in 1998, even though the problem actually started in 1990: leaving it far too late to decide something to protect civilians, and maintain peace and stability in the region. It has to be mentioned here that vetoes impacted considerably upon SC decisions with regard to Kosovo; but in Libya, Russia did not prevent any SC resolution, and merely abstained instead. In the case of Kosovo, the debate over the legality and legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention has continued among international law scholars and practitioners. The SC did not authorize the intervention in Kosovo, but NATO interpreted its resolutions as allowing the use all necessary force and included in this, force against violators of human rights violators. It also believed that the SC would not adopt any resolution, because of the threat of vetoes by the permanent members. The intervention in Kosovo was illegal because of the interpretation of the UN Charter. But in the Libya case, the SC intervened quickly to solve the matter, and restore international peace and security. Resolution 1973 authorizes the use of all necessary measures against human rights violators in Libya. All in all, the intervention is legitimized by the SC under international law and the UN Charter. To sum up, the SC is charged with protecting and maintaining international peace and security, but also respecting human rights, and protecting civilians from the threat of attack. From Kosovo to Libya, the international community may have different approaches over intervention, but this has to be equal in cases of all countries. If there is a risk to human rights in the international community, the SC has to implement clear resolutions: as it has done in the case of Libya. Finally, according to the UN Charter, the SC has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, and the Charter gives responsibility to use all necessary measures and determine the threat of attack against peace and security. Regional organizations do not have any authority to use all necessary measures without the SC authorization. Therefore, all actions have to be based upon SC authorization.
